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Effects of Family Control on Degree and Type of Diversification: Empirical 
Evidence for Business Groups
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper analyses the impact of ownership structure on corporate diversification, with 
reference to large listed family business groups. By considering agency theory and 
socioemotional wealth, the study examines the relationship between family ownership, 
concentration of ownership, and degree and type of diversification. The study considers 
ninety-nine Spanish listed business groups (50 family-controlled- and 49 non-family-
controlled groups) and considers diversification of business group as the focus of analysis. 
The results show how family business groups present a lower preference for unrelated 
diversification than related diversification. There is also a non-linear relationship between 
concentration of ownership in family groups and degree of diversification, showing different 
behaviour in family groups according to shares owned by the family’s leading shareholders. 
This paper contributes to literature by providing a more precise identification of the corporate 
strategy adopted by business groups and establishing new evidence about the impact of family 
control on diversification strategies and the differences regarding non-family business groups.
KEYWORDS:  Family Firm, Business Group, Diversification, Ownership Concentration, 
Socioemotional Wealth.
1. Introduction
In the last few years there has been a growing interest in analysing the influence of ownership 
and the nature of the major shareholders on diversification strategy (Lane et al., 1999; 
Goranova et al., 2007; Del Brio et al., 2010). Given the importance of family firms in the 
world economy (Moores, 2009) and the characteristics that distinguish them from non-family 
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firms (Chrisman et al., 2005), family control could be a decisive factor for diversification, 
although new evidence is still required (Tsai et al., 2009; Daspit et al., 2017). 
While non-family firms pursue profit maximization, family firms also seek the 
achievement of non-financial objectives such as survival and continuity, and the preservation 
of socioemotional capital (Arregle et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). This fact may 
cause a different strategic behaviour between family and non-family firms, and more 
specifically in terms of diversification (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) find that family firms use fewer product diversification strategies 
that non-family firms. Similar results obtained by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) indicate that, on 
average, family firms diversify less in both domestic and international markets than non-
family firms. The conclusions obtained by these authors are corroborated by subsequent 
studies (Miller et al., 2010; Muñoz & Sanchez, 2011; Muñoz et al., 2018). However, these 
studies analyze diversification from the point of view of a single unit, the firm. This leads to a 
distorted vision of these companies’ corporate strategies, given that many of them are parent 
companies of business groups, and the decision to diversify is taken at the level of business 
group rather than that of the parent company (Young et al., 2008), 
A business group is defined as an organization in which legally independent enterprises are 
controlled by the same entrepreneur (the parent company) through an ownership chain. On the 
other hand, a parent company is defined as a firm that owns enough voting stock in another 
company to control management and influence the election of the board of directors. Thus, a 
company is considered a dependent of a parent company either if the latter possesses more 
than fifty percent of the stock of the dependent company, or if it possesses a lower percentage 
of stock but still has the ability to exert effective control over the dependent company. In 
summary then, when analysing diversification, considering the parent company only takes 
into account one company, whereas if diversification is considered for the business group as a 
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whole, that is, both for the parent company and the subsidiary companies, this enables a better 
analysis of the diversification strategies.
In many studies about business groups, diversification is considered an exogenous variable 
that influences performance (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003; Fauver et al., 2003). Very few studies 
have considered diversification as an endogenous variable and analysed the influence of 
family ownership as a determining factor of diversification of a business group. Fauver et al. 
(2003) conclude that a greater concentration of ownership decreases the degree of 
diversification of business group, results confirmed by other authors (Delios et al., 2008; 
Chen and Yu, 2011). In addition, Chung (2013) finds that ‘family management and family 
ownership play key roles in diversification decisions in family business groups… where 
likelihood of diversification declines as a controlling family assigns more family members to 
an affiliate firm’s key leadership positions’ . 
However, previous works have focused on the analysis of the degree of diversification, 
without taking into account the type of diversification (related and unrelated diversification). 
In this regard, the following question arises: does the family firm show greater preference for 
related diversification or for unrelated diversification? These strategic options are only rarely 
considered, and with inconclusive results. Ducassy & Prevot, 2010 find that there is no 
difference between family and non-family businesses in terms of the choice of diversification 
type (related or unrelated). On the other hand, Miller et al. (2010) find a positive relationship 
between family control and related diversification and a negative relationship between family 
control and unrelated diversification. Therefore, in the literature there is a need to study in 
greater depth the type of diversification strategy preferred by those companies controlled by 
family members.
In the same way, the non-linear relationship between family ownership and diversification 
is rarely analysed.  Although Anderson & Reeb (2003) and Chen & Yu (2011) analyse it 
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when talking about total diversification, there is no research where this quadratic model is 
proposed for related and unrelated diversification. In this regard, this paper seeks to provide 
new contributions to overcoming this gap, exploring whether a greater concentration of 
ownership in the hands of the family may condition a greater or lesser preference for related 
or unrelated diversification.
In line with this research, the objective of this study is to analyse the impact of family 
control on type of diversification (related and unrelated) in large Spanish listed family 
business groups, and thereby to try to determine whether one type of diversification strategy 
is preferred over the other. In addition, the existence of a non-linear model between family 
ownership and the degree of related and unrelated diversification is proposed.
This paper contributes to the literature on family firms and diversification in several ways. 
First, the paper uses business group as the unit of analysis of diversification. It allows a better 
identification of diversification strategy, avoiding the omissions that occur when the activities 
only of the parent company are analysed rather than of the business group as a whole.
Second, the paper aims to contribute to filling the gap that exists in studies of the 
preference of family business groups for related and unrelated diversification strategies. 
Additionally, the existence of a non-linear model is proposed for related and non-related 
diversification, an aspect not analysed in the literature.
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, the theoretical framework is presented that 
establishes the impact of family control on degree and type of diversification, starting with 
agency theory and supported by the concept of socioemotional wealth. Secondly, the 
database, variables and econometric techniques used to test hypotheses are described. Thirdly, 
the main results of the econometric models are analysed. Finally, the main conclusions, 
implications, limitations and future lines of research are presented.
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2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
According to agency theory, when concentration of ownership is very low, managers seek to 
satisfy their utility function, which includes aspects such as higher remuneration, higher 
prestige and lower personal risk of being fired (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1986; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1986). A principal-agent problem arises due to the different interests between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1986), thus increasing agency costs. Most of the literature 
that analyses the relationship between ownership and diversification is dominated by the 
model of the Anglo-Saxon firm, the latter characterized by dispersed share ownership and 
wide managerial discretion. Regarding diversification strategy, firms controlled by managers 
prefer diversification (Laeven & Levine, 2007), since new products and activities enable 
managers satisfy their personal needs about their remuneration, power and personal risk 
(Sayrak & Martin, 2001). 
The manager-controlled firm is not the dominant form of business in Europe and Spain (La 
Porta et al., 1999). In Spain, ownership is highly concentrated, which results in the principal-
agent agency problem being reduced (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Thus, in Spain, differences in 
ownership come from differences between the groups of shareholders that have enough shares 
to control the firm, that is, families, financial entities, foreign capital, etc.  In family firms, 
families seek to maximize the firm’s value while keeping control in family hands (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). In these cases, family firms show less diversification than firms where 
managers have greater discretionary power (principal-agent problem), as there are no 
constraints regarding continuity of control (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010; Miller et al., 2010). Family control prevents diversification processes that may 
compromise the survival of the company, as it may occur in cases where diversification is the 
result of the principal-agent problem rather than the aim of creating value (Berger & Ofek, 
1995). 
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However, when most of the family’s wealth is invested in the firm, this increases its 
financial risk (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), and diversification could be an attractive strategy, 
reducing the firm’s risk, variability of income and expected results (Eisenmann, 2002) in 
order to prevent bankruptcy (Storey, 1994). Nonetheless, family firms not only maximize 
their utility according to financial results and reduction of supported risk, but they also value 
other socioemotional aspects that can influence degree of diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010). According to Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz & Gomez-Mejia (2012), the concept of 
socioemotional wealth includes: the desire to maintain family control of the firm; the desire to 
ensure the firm’s survival in order to be subsequently passed on to later generations; the 
family’s identification with the firm; the establishment of long-lasting relationships with 
different stakeholders; and emotional links that favour trust, loyalty, motivation and 
commitment. However, the intensity of preferences for the aforementioned desires can differ 
between family firms, giving rise to different behaviour with respect to diversification, as will 
be seen later.
In the firm- or business-group growth process, families can decide on different 
diversification strategies (diversification in related businesses or in unrelated businesses). 
Although both types present costs for the business group (Denis et al., 2002), they also 
involve a series of advantages. Diversification in related businesses makes better use of 
economies of scale and scope (Barney, 1991; Montgomery, 1985), accruing benefits from the 
firm’s core activity and consumer base (Newbound et al., 1978). Related diversification also 
makes better uses of the business’s main resources and capabilities, is less complex and less 
costly for the group (Markides & Williamson, 1994). For a business group owned by family 
members, this strategy can allow greater value creation to be achieved (Park & Soo Cheong, 
2013), which can compensate any loss of socioemotional wealth derived from diversification 
process. On the other hand, unrelated diversification reduces income variability and financial 
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risk to a lesser extent by focusing on businesses and activities with non-correlated cash flows 
(Shleifer & Visnhy, 1986; Amit & Livnat, 1988). However, this type of diversification does 
not allow synergies between activities.
When it comes to prefer one type of diversification or the other, since the pioneer study by 
Rumelt (1974), the literature shows superior performance and productivity in related 
diversification (Gomes & Livdan, 2004; Park & SooCheong, 2013), and a negative impact of 
unrelated diversification on profits and productivity (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005; Chang & Wang, 2007). The literature also reveals that unrelated 
diversification tends to be more used in firms where share ownership is more dispersed and 
where managers can exercise greater discretion, seeking to satisfy their personal interests at 
the cost of value creation and business results (Denis et al., 1997).
Unrelated diversification involves higher costs, more uncertainty and a greater need for 
financial resources, requiring the use of external sources of financing, and family business 
groups are more reluctant to implant such diversification as they seek to maintain the family’s 
control of the business group (Miller & Le Breton Miller, 2009). Unrelated diversification can 
require new resources and skills, with no synergies created from the resources already 
available in the family. The family could lack the know-how and skills required in the new 
businesses (McConaughy, 2000; Schulze et al., 2003), whereas those acquired in their current 
operations could be used more effectively in more similar activities. A family business group 
will opt for lower levels of unrelated diversification to preserve its socioemotional wealth 
(i.e., to retain control of the enterprise, to preserve familial relations, etc.), although this 
involves increasing financial risk or turning down new investments that would improve the 
business’s economic position (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
Related diversification can take advantage of synergies between the original activities and 
new activities. Family members will invest in activities that generate fewer costs and less 
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uncertainty, preferring those related diversification strategies that are better at preserving 
socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) and do not harm the social capital based on 
familial relations. For all these reasons, when business group is owned by family members, it 
is expected to be willing to diversify more in related activities than diversify in unrelated 
activities. This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: If a business group diversifies, greater family control means a lower 
preference for unrelated diversification than related diversification.
In family business groups, family control reduces the principal-agent problem (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Miller & Le Breton Miller, 2006), as the family’s interests align with those of 
the other shareholders and aim at creation of value and survival of the business group 
(Arregle et al., 2007). A family firm will adopt strategies that optimize their results, subject to 
the constraint of maintaining family control of resources (Jones et al., 2008). Since 
diversification can lead to a loss of family control and a loss of socioemotional wealth, family 
members prefer lower diversification levels (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
However, where the family has ensured control of the business group, if the level of family 
ownership concentration is very high a principal-principal problem can arise (Zahra, 2005; 
Aguilera & Crespi-Cladera, 2012). The family can increase the level of diversification 
strategy in order to reduce risk even when it could be harmful for the other, non-family 
minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). Therefore, family control has a double effect on 
diversification, depending on higher or lower levels of concentration of ownership; hence a 
non-linear model could be considered to relate concentration of family ownership and degree 
of diversification.
When the wealth of family members is committed to the firm, they support a greater 
financial risk, and there are incentives to reduce it to a minimum (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Faccio et al., 2001). Participation in new businesses enables the family to reduce the firm’s 
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risk and the variability of its results (Eisenmann, 2002), although this also risks the possible 
loss of socioemotional wealth derived from diversification. In the literature, it is found that 
high levels of family ownership lead to increased diversification (Chen & Yu, 2011; George 
& Kabir, 2012), and the presence of an inverted u-shape relationship between family 
ownership and divestment likelihood is shown (Praet, 2013). So the following question arises: 
do high levels of family ownership concentration cause a change in the attitude of the family 
towards the diversification strategy?
Agency theory establishes a double impact of family ownership in diversification. First, as 
the family increases its stake in the share capital of the company the total degree of 
diversification is reduced, because the principal-agent agency problem diminishes; beyond a 
certain level, however, a principal-principal problem can arise between the family and the 
other non-family minority shareholders (Pindado et al., 2014). The high financial risk taken 
by family members facilitates the application of diversification strategies.
According to the socioemotional-wealth perspective, the concentration of family 
ownership can have a double effect on degree of diversification. At first, when concentration 
of family ownership increases, family interest in diversification of the business group 
decreases in order to preserve socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012). However, the 
concept of socioemotional wealth also includes the survival of the company and its transfer to 
later generations. When the family wealth invested in the business group is high, the family’s 
risk significantly increases, which can endanger the survival of the firm. However, the family 
members can diversify as a means of reducing risk and improving survival. 
There are circumstances in which family firms can benefit from the advantages of 
diversification even when diversification negatively impacts on socioemotional wealth 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Although family control negatively impacts the level of 
diversification, the relationship between both can be affected by ownership concentration. 
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When shares held by family members that control the business group are not very high (lower 
levels of family ownership), preservation of socioemotional wealth has a greater importance 
than the risk reduction. Family members renounce the positive effects of diversification on 
risk reduction in favour of family control of the company.  On the other hand, when the 
control of business group is exerted by family members, an additional increase in the shares 
held by family members (higher levels of family ownership) causes a greater desire to 
decrease family risk, seeking to ensure the survival of the business group. In sum, 
concentration of ownership in family groups influences the application of diversification 
strategies, although the effect can be two-fold (Chen & Yu, 2011; Praet, 2013). This leads to 
the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between concentration of family ownership and degree of 
total diversification is non-linear; it is negative at low levels of concentration of ownership 
and positive at high levels.
The above arguments are also valid concerning the relationship between family ownership 
concentration and type of diversification (the existence of U-shaped relationship between 
family ownership concentration and the degree of related and unrelated diversification). At 
first, increases of shares held by family members have a negative influence on related and/or 
unrelated diversification (family control of business group is prioritized with respect the 
decrease of risk). However, above a certain level, a higher concentration of family ownership 
promotes unrelated diversification (where a business group is owned by a family, risk 
reduction is more important to ensure survival and therefore preserve socioemotional wealth).
Related diversification aims to make use of all production factors to obtain synergies 
between activities, while unrelated diversification primarily aims to reduce the firm or 
business group’s global risk. When family firms invest in new activities with a low cash-flow 
correlation (unrelated diversification), their financial risk is reduced to a greater extent than 
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when related diversification strategies are used (Shleifer & Visnhy, 1986; Amit & Livnat, 
1988).
Therefore, as greater concentration of ownership can cause a principal-principal agency 
problem, whereby the family seeks to reduce the firm’s risk, concentration of ownership 
would have a greater impact on the degree of unrelated diversification, with degree of 
diversification possibly following a non-linear model. On the other hand, having ensured 
control of the firm, the family could seek to satisfy its own interests, appropriating part of the 
wealth of minority shareholders, and this is easier by means of unrelated diversification (Chen 
& Yu, 2011). When diversifying in unrelated businesses, it is easier to use ‘tunnelling’ 
practices to transfer wealth f om minority to majority shareholders, in this case family 
members (Kali & Sarkar, 2011).  This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between concentration of family ownership and degree of 
related and unrelated diversification is non-linear (it is negative at low levels of 
concentration of ownership and positive at high levels).
3. Research methodology
3.1 Sample and data sources
The initial sample consists of 112 companies listed on the Spanish stock markets in 2000-
2005.  After eliminating firms with missing data and outliers, the final sample consists of 99 
firms that lead business groups (i.e., all listed companies have subsidiaries), and final panel 
data consists of 594 observations. 
As mentioned in previous sections, a business group is defined as an organization in which 
legally independent enterprises are controlled by the same entrepreneur (the parent company) 
through an ownership chain. Thus, a company is considered a dependent of the parent 
company either if the latter possesses more than fifty percent of the stock of the dependent 
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company, or if it possesses a lower percentage of stock but still has the ability to exert 
effective control over the dependent company. Firms that form part of pyramidal groups 
dependent on listed parents companies were identified by means of accounts summaries. This 
information is provided by the Spanish National Stock Market Commission (CNMV).  
Values of the diversification variable were calculated from the information available in the 
SABI-Informa database, which contains precise information about non-listed firms controlled 
by listed parent companies, identifying their main activities and turnover. To identify the 
main activities, SABI-Informa uses the CNAE 93 Rev.1, a Spanish Economic Activity 
Classification that uses a four-digit code to identify and classify companies according to their 
economic activity. It is an adaptation of the European NACE and similar to the Standard 
Industrial Classification, SIC. This variable, together with the turnover (also provided by 
Sabi-Informa), allows diversification to be measured using the entropy index (Jacquemin & 
Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985), as will be seen in the following section.
The CNMV website was also used to identify family-run parent companies, analysing 
significant shareholdings, treasury stock and corporate governance reports. If in doubt, 
recourse was made to the SABI-Informa database and secondary sources of information such 
as the press and the sample firm’s websites. Both sources (CNMV and SABI-Informa) were 
also used to obtain the accounting and financial information required.
3.2 Variables of the study
Dependent variables: diversification.
When measuring degree and type of diversification, most research only considers parent 
company activities (Kang, 1999; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2010). However, it would appear to be more pertinent to consider the activities of 
the entire business group, including both the parent company and the pyramidal group of 
dependent firms. Diversification is thus measured more objectively, as the activities of 
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dependent firms also form part of the parent company’s overall strategy. Furthermore, 
analysis of the business group more easily identifies related and unrelated activities.
Diversification in the analysed business groups was defined by quantitative variables. To 
measure business-group diversification, a wide variety of diversification indices may be 
created (Rumelt, 1982), such as Gort’s, index, Herfindhal index, Gini index, etc. In this paper 
entropy indices were used to measure total, related and unrelated, diversification (Jacquemin 
& Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985), because these indices are considered in the literature to be the 
most suitable (Hoskisson et al., 1993). Compared to other indices, the entropy index takes into 
consideration the number of segments in which a firm operates and the relative importance of 
each of the segments in the total sales of the firm. Moreover, the entropy index is useful in the 
sense that it can be decomposed into components showing inter-industry (not-related) and 
intra-industry (related) diversification (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979). 
To calculate diversification indices, we had to identify the core activities of both the parent 
company and its dependent firms (available in SABI-Informa), incorporating the respective 
turnover values (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985):
To calculate diversification indices, we had to identify the core activities of both the parent 
company and its dependent firms (available in SABI-Informa), incorporating the respective 
turnover values (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985):
a) Entropy index of Total Diversification (TOTAL DIVERSIFICATION): 
,i
n
i
i S
STD 1ln
1



Where Si is the proportion of activity (turnover) in CNAE93 Rev.1 code “i”, for a group 
with “n” number of activities. This measure reflects the number of activities performed by the 
group and the importance of each activity. Different activities are activities with different 
CNAE93 Rev. 1 codes (4 digits).
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b) Entropy Index of Related Diversification (RELATED DIVERSIFICATION): 
, where 
j
m
j
j SRDRD 


1
j
i
n
ji
j
ij S
SRD 1ln


Where Sj is the share of industrial sector “j” in the firm’s total turnover, RDj is degree of 
related diversification, Sij is the share of activity “I”, belonging to industrial sector “j”, in the 
group’s total turnover, “n” is the number of activities and “m” the number of industrial 
sectors. Activities are considered with regards to 4 digits, while sectors are established 
according to the first two CNAE93 Rev. 1 digits.  
c) Entropy index of Unrelated Diversification (UNRELATED DIVERSIFICATION):
j
m
j
j
S
SUD 1ln
1



Where Sj is the share in total group turnover in industrial sector “j”, and m is the number of 
sectors. Activities are considered with regards to 4 digits, while sectors are established 
according to the first two CNAE93 Rev. 1 digits. 
Independent variables: family firm and concentration of ownership.
A group is considered to be under a family’s control when the family (family members) owns 
the most important shareholding (directly and indirectly) in the listed parent company, and 
one or several family members occupy key management positions and sit on the Board of 
Directors (Chua et al., 1999; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Family members were 
identified based on same surnames plus an analysis of the presence of married couples. In 
Spain it is important to note that family ties can be found due the two-surname system: 
women never take their husband’s surname, whereas children take both their father’s and 
mother’s surnames (first and second surname). A group is thus a family enterprise (FAMILY) 
when the parent company remains under family control throughout the study period, with no 
changes in the last owner during that time.  The correct classification of family business 
groups was verified by analysing horizontal and vertical ownership chains using the method 
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proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) and used in subsequent studies (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Faccio et al., 2001). In both cases, classification of family groups is consistent with that 
applied in this study, with no discrepancy in the familial nature of the group. This is because 
Spain is characterized by high levels of family ownership concentration. The dummy variable 
FAMILY is used where 1 represent a group controlled by family members and 0 otherwise.
Degree of concentration of ownership is measured by the shares in the hands of the listed 
parent company’s five leading shareholders (% 5 MAIN SHAREHOLDERS) (Kang, 1999). 
This variable reflects the degree of managerial discretionality, as greater concentration of 
ownership reduces the discrepancy between the interests of managers and shareholders, 
limiting such discretionality (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Control variables
In the paper, several control variables are considered (Kang, 1999; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Ducassy & Prevot, 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2010; Chen & Yu, 2011): a) 
size (LN SIZE), measured as the logarithm of total parent company assets; b) age (LN AGE), 
measured as the logarithm of the difference between 2000 and the year of establishment of the 
listed parent company; c) indebtedness (DEBT), measured as the ratio between the total debt 
and total assets of the listed parent company; d) capital intensity (CAPITAL INTENSITY), 
measured as the ratio between total material and immaterial fixed assets and number of 
employees of listed parent company; e) intangible assets (INTANGIBLE), representing the 
listed parent company’s investment in new technologies and measured as the ratio between 
intangible and total assets; f) degree of managerial discretion, measured as the difference 
between the firm’s economic returns and mean economic returns for the year of the sample 
(ECONOMIC RETURN – ECONOMIC RETURN YEAR), which enables us to analyse 
degree of managerial discretion in decision-making; b) structural change (STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE DUMMY), a dummy variable that is 1 when there has been a structural change in 
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the listed parent company and 0 otherwise. In the regressions, it is also controlled for year 
dummy variables.
3.3 Econometrics
The present study examines differences in the mean of the model’s variables according to the 
nature of main shareholder of control of business group, and correlations between the 
different study variables. To estimate the impact of family control and concentration of family 
ownership on the group’s degree and type of diversification, panel data are used (the database 
comprises a sample of 99 listed parent companies over a 6-year period). Unobservable 
heterogeneity is controlled for to avoid biased results being obtained (Wooldridge, 2002). 
After verifying the existence of unobservable heterogeneity (by the Bresuch-Pagan Lagrange 
multipliers test), is necessary to determine the existence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation problems. To solve heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems when 
working with panel data, Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) or Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS) estimators can be used (Cameron & Triverdi, 2010). PCSE technique 
has been chosen because standard errors are more precise and it is among the most used in 
estimating panel data (Beck, 2001; Beck and Katz, 1995). PCSE preserves the weighting of 
observations for autocorrelation, but uses a sandwich estimator to incorporate cross-sectional 
dependence when calculating standard errors, while FGLS produces inaccurate coefficient 
standard errors (Mantobaye, Rea & Reed, 2017). 
Next, it is necessary to determine the use of fixed effects (unobservable heterogeneity 
correlated with the explanatory variables) or random effects (unobservable heterogeneity not 
correlated with the explanatory variables) in the model. Considering the possible presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, which affect the validity of estimations, the Wald test 
proposed by Wooldridge (2002) is used to select the most appropriate model (fixed or random 
effects) because the Hausman test is not valid when there are problems of either 
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heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation, or both (Woolridge, 2002). The Wald-Wooldridge test 
compares estimations of the fixed-effects model and random-effects model. If systematic 
differences are found (the null hypothesis of equality is rejected) there still a correlation 
between the error and the regressors, and it is preferable to choose the fixed-effects model. 
Otherwise the random-effects model is chosen (Woolridge, 2002).
Presence of multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity are tested in econometric models. To 
establish the presence of multicollinearity, VIF values of the respective multiple linear 
regression and tolerance are estimated. If they are less than 0.1 or more than 10, respectively, 
this shows the existence of multicollinearity. The absence of multicollinearity was checked in 
all the regressions in this study. The Wald-Wooldridge test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed and random effects was performed to check for heteroskedasticity in panel data 
models (fixed and random). The results are robust to concerns of heteroskedasticity. All the 
models were estimated using the STATA 10.1 econometric program.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The sample consists of 50 business groups in which the listed parent company is controlled by 
family shareholders and 49 business groups controlled by non-family shareholders. This 
confirms the importance of families on the stock market, and is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies (Sacristán et al., 2011).
Table 1 analyses the difference in means of the main study variables according to family 
control of business group, showing correlations between the model’s different variables.  
When analysing diversification, family business groups present a lower degree of total and 
unrelated diversification, with no differences in degree of related diversification.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
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Listed parent companies controlled by family members show greater concentration of 
ownership, are less intensive in productive capital, are smaller and have been involved in a 
smaller number of mergers and takeovers. In relation to mean dispersion in ‘return on firm 
investment relative to mean return on investment of sample firms', there are differences 
between family and non-family parent companies, with less managerial discretionality in the 
former. When analysing correlations between the model variables, family groups present a 
negative correlation with diversification (total, related and unrelated), confirming the 
previously mentioned results. They also show a positive relationship with concentration of 
ownership and a negative relationship with size of listed company, age, investment in 
intangible assets and involvement in mergers and takeovers. Also, greater concentration of 
ownership in the hands of five leading shareholders is negatively related to the different types 
of diversification and to the size of the parent company, and positively to the difference 
between mean returns of the parent company and mean returns of sample firms in the year in 
question. On the other hand, the diversification variables, regardless of type, are positively 
related to size of parent company and to the variable representing structural changes resulting 
from mergers and takeovers, and are negatively related to differences in returns. Except for 
related diversification, in the other variables that measure degree of diversification (total and 
unrelated), there is a positive relationship with indebtedness and a negative relationship with 
capital intensity.
4.2 Family Control and Diversification
Table 2 presents the results of panel data models, showing the impact of family control of the 
business group on degree of total, related and unrelated diversification. The use of panel data 
is justified by the presence of unobservable heterogeneity in all the models. After verifying 
the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the Wald test proposed by Wooldridge 
(2002) shows the existence of random effects in the models used to analyse total and 
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unrelated diversification, while there are fixed effects in the related diversification model. The 
significance of Hausman’s chi-square supports the validity of the presented models..
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
The first significant observation is the zero impact of family control on degree of total 
diversification (see model 1 in Table 2), so that family and non-family groups present the 
same behaviour. Regarding degree of related and unrelated diversification, Table 2 shows 
how family groups diversify less in unrelated activities than non-family groups (see model 3 
in Table 2), and there are no differences between family and non-family groups when it 
comes to diversifying in related activities (see model 2 in Table 2), supporting hypothesis H1.
Table 3 analyses the possible non-linear relationship between degree of diversification and 
concentration of ownership in family groups. The model thus contemplates the percentage of 
shares owned by the five leading shareholders when the group is under family control (% 5 
MAIN SHAREHOLDERS * FAMILY) and its value squared. As with the previous models 
there is unobservable heterogeneity; random-effects models are more appropriate for 
analysing the degree of total and unrelated diversification and fixed-effects models for related 
diversification. Table 3 shows a non-linear relationship between concentration of ownership 
in family groups and diversification (see model 1 in Table 3). Initially, increased 
concentration of ownership of family groups has a negative impact, although beyond a certain 
level of family control, further increases in family ownership favour diversification 
(hypothesis H2 is supported). Although family ownership of a business group had no impact 
on the degree of total diversification on Table 2, this could be because of the compensation 
effect derived from the dual impact (both negative and positive) of concentration of 
ownership on diversification in family groups.
With regards to type of diversification, Table 3 confirms the null impact of family control 
on related diversification (see model 2 in Table 3), while the existence of a non-linear 
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relationship (see model 3 in Table 3) between concentration of family ownership and degree 
of unrelated diversification is also confirmed (U-shaped model between family ownership and 
diversification), supporting hypothesis H3 for unrelated diversification.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
4.3 Discussion of Results
In general terms, the impact of family ownership on degree of diversification is confirmed 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller & Le Bretton Miller, 2006), and specifically, a non-linear 
relationship is established as a function of concentration of ownership in family groups, with 
a negative impact with moderate concentration of ownership and a positive impact when 
concentration of ownership is greater (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chen & Yu, 2011). Initially, 
the family acquires the shares required to maintain control of the business group. In this 
situation, the interests of shareholders and managers (who are often family members) are 
aligned, reducing the type I agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Miller & Le Breton 
Miller, 2006), and seek the business group’s survival, so they will prefer lower degrees of 
diversification than non-family groups (Goranova et al., 2007). In this case, performing new 
activities reduces the independence of the family, causing a reduction in socioemotional 
wealth (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2010).  
When analysing possible differences between family and non-family groups according to 
different types of diversification, the study finds that family groups prefer similar degrees of 
related diversification compared to non-family groups (Ducassy & Prevot, 2010), although 
family ownership has a negative impact on the use of unrelated diversification strategies 
(Miller et al., 2010). Unrelated diversification can reduce the risk supported by the family 
(Larraza, et al., 2004), but the need for new resources and skills (Schulze et al., 2002), greater 
organisational complexity (Eisenmann, 2002), lack of skills and know-how among family 
members (Schulze et al., 2003), and possible loss of socio-emotion wealth (Gomez-Mejia et 
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al., 2007) explain why this strategy is used less by family groups. The conclusion is that 
family groups prefer to diversify in related rather than unrelated businesses (Kang, 1999).
Note that there is a non-linear relationship between concentration of family ownership and 
degree of unrelated diversification; with moderate unrelated diversification, concentration of 
family ownership diminishes the degree of such diversification, although it starts to increase 
at a given point. When the family has high levels of ownership, in order to reduce the risk 
supported by the family (Larraza et al., 2004), family groups prefer greater degrees of 
unrelated diversification.
5. Conclusions
This paper analyses the impact of family control and concentration of ownership on 
diversification strategies (related and unrelated) in large Spanish business groups in which the 
parent company is listed. It is based on a sample of 99 groups with listed parent companies, 
identifying those that are under family control and the estimating degree of total, related and 
unrelated diversification.
The study shows the existence of a negative influence of family control on unrelated 
diversification (Miller et al., 2010), but no relationship between family control and related 
diversification, and this shows that there is a lower preference for unrelated diversification 
compared to related diversification. This represents a new contribution to literature, with few 
studies analysing the influence of family on the type of diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010; Larraza et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2010). Business groups owned by family members 
will invest in activities that generate fewer costs and less uncertainty, preferring related 
diversification strategies that preserve more socioemotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). Family groups prefer diversification strategies that have a positive impact on 
performance (Gomes & Livdan, 2004) and show a decreased interest in unrelated 
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diversification because it is more complicated and difficult than related diversification 
(Eisenmann, 2002). Unrelated diversification involves higher costs, more uncertainty, greater 
need for financial resources (usually external), and new skills and know-how (Schulze et al., 
2003; Miller & Le Breton Miller, 2009), thus related diversification strategies that allow a 
better use of economies of scale and scope, and enable more synergies, are more attractive for 
family members (Wan et al., 2011). Additionally, related diversification allows better control 
of the business group for family members (Miller & Le Breton Miller, 2009). 
With regard to the concentration of ownership in family groups, the study shows a non-
linear relationship with degree of diversification, which decreases (total and unrelated) as 
concentration of ownership grows; however, from a certain level, increases in concentration 
of ownership in family groups increase the degree of diversification (total and unrelated). To 
being with, as the family increases its stake in the share capital of the company, the degree of 
diversification is reduced, because the principal-agent agency problem diminishes and family 
interest in diversification of business group decreases in order to preserve socioemotional 
wealth (Berrone et al., 2012). However, when the family wealth invested in the business 
group becomes high, participation in new businesses enables the family to reduce the firm’s 
risk and the variability of its results (Eisenmann, 2002), and to seek to ensure the survival of 
the business group, an important element of social-emotional wealth. When control of the 
business group is exerted by family members, an additional increase in the shares held by 
family members (higher levels of family ownership) causes a greater desire to decrease family 
risk and to seek to ensure the survival of the business group. The non-linear model does not 
occur in the case of related diversification, since an increase in the number of related activities 
does not allow for risk diversification, but rather the opposite.
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6. Contributions,  limitations and suggestions for future research
This research makes several contributions. Firstly, diversification is measured by considering 
business groups, facilitating the identification of related and unrelated activities and showing 
more appropriately the group’s strategy. Secondly, the study provides new evidence of the 
impact of ownership structure of business groups with listed parent companies on related and 
unrelated diversification, together with the existence for family business groups of a non-
linear relationship between degree of diversification and concentration of ownership. Both 
agency and the socioemotional wealth theories are used to support our hypothesis.
Finally, the study shows how family ownership is a key factor in strategic decisions, more 
specifically in diversification decisions. The duality between family control and risk reduction 
has a double effect on socioemotional wealth, conditioning growth decisions. 
The research, however, does have a series of limitations. Firstly, it compares family and 
non-family groups, while it could be more appropriate to consider the ultimate owner of non-
family business groups, whether they are controlled by banks, non-national companies, 
investment funds, the State, etc., as different objectives can have different effects on 
diversification strategies.
Secondly, the results are valid for business groups in which the parent company is listed, 
and cannot be generalized to family groups or firms that are smaller and/or unlisted. Another 
possible line of research is therefore to establish the relationship between family ownership, 
concentration of ownership and diversification for unlisted business groups.
Thirdly, it would be interesting for family groups to analyse the current generation in both 
business ownership and management in more detail, considering the presence of the founder, 
and his or her children or cousins. According to Gomez-Mejia and others (2007), the desire to 
preserve socioemotional wealth varies in different generations; as ownership is diluted in 
subsequent generations (children, cousins), socioemotional wealth is less important for the 
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utility function of family members. Financial risk and risk minimisation becomes more 
important, involving a more positive attitude to diversification strategies.
Finally, it should be pointed out that Spain is characterized by a legal system, based on 
civil law, that has an institutional and regulatory framework to protect minority stockholders 
and that is weaker than the institutional framework of the United States or the United 
Kingdom (La Porta et al., 1999); this explains Spain’s greater concentration of company 
holdings in general and its greater concentration of holdings in family businesses in particular. 
It would be interesting to carry out the study for other countries because this would allow the 
verification of possible differences in group diversification according to the existing 
institutional framework in the country (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). 
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Table 1: Differences in means of principal study variables according to family ownership of business group and correlations between study variables
MEAN
FAMILY NO FAMILY
T-
Student
TOTAL 
DIVERSIFICATION
RELATED
 DIVERSIFICATION
UNRELALTED 
DIVERSIFICATION FAMILY
% 5 MAIN 
SHAREHOLDERS
LN
SIZE
LN 
AGE DEBT INTANGIBLES
ECONOMIC 
RETURN-
ECONOMIC 
RETURN YEAR
CAPITAL 
INTENSITY
STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE 
DUMMY
TOTAL
DIVERSIFICATION 0,50 0,73 *** 1
RELATED
DIVERSIFICATION 0,15 0,18 NS 0,68
a 1
UNRELALTED
DIVERSIFICATION 0,34 0,54 *** 0,92
a 0,34a 1
FAMILY 50,50% 49,50% --- -0,26a -0,19a -0,27a 1
% 5 MAIN
SHAREHOLDERS 65,96%
48,36 
% *** -0,18
a -0,10b -0,17a 0,33a 1
LN
SIZE 11,46 12,45 *** 0,43
a 0,34a 0,37a -0,32a -0,13a 1
LN
AGE 3,59 3,66 NS 0,01 -0,04 0,03 -0,10
b 0,07 -0,01 1
DEBT 0,37 0,39 NS 0,14a 0,08 0,14a -0,05 0,06 0,46a 0,11a 1
INTANGIBLES 0,02 0,03 NS 0,03 -0,02 0,08 -0,12a -0,02 0,02 -0,02 0,10b 1
ECONOMIC RETURN-
ECONOMIC RETURN YEAR -0,01 0,01 ** -0,27
a -0,12a -0,28a -0,03 0,11a 0,02 0,10b -0,11a 0,12a 1
CAPITAL
INTENSITY 4,56 4,84 * -0,10
b 0,07 -0,17a -0,02 0,16a 0,17a 0,01 0,12a 0,10b 0,01 1
STRUCTURAL
CHANGE DUMMY 18% 27 % ** 0,40
a 0,42a 0,36a -0,10b 0,03 0,58a -0,03 0,20a 0,04 0,010 0,10b 1
NOTE.    Spearman’s rank correlation for dummy variables; Pearson’s correlation for non-dummy variables.
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** < .01 NS: non-significant
a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)
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Table 2: Impact of family ownership on degree and type of diversification
TOTAL
DIVERSIFICATION
RELATED 
DIVERSIFICATION
UNRELATED 
DIVERSIFICATION
PCSE (RE) PCSE (FE) PCSE (RE)
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
-0.073 -0,022 -0,969**FAMILY (-1,26) (-0,34) (2,03)
0,106*** -0,009 0,068***LN SIZE (5,42) (-0,68) (4,28)
0,011 -0,062*** 0,011LN AGE (0,39) (-3,24) (0,43)
-0,108 -0,028 -0,032DEBT (-1,21) (-1,03) (-0,46)
-0,291** -0,051 -0,179INTANGIBLE (-2,13) (-1,28) (-1,49)
-0,933*** -0,082** -0,726***ECONOMIC RETURN-
ECONOMIC RETURN YEAR (-5,51) (-2,19) (-4,95)
-0,048*** 0,001 -0,047***CAPITAL INTENSITY (-4,45) (0,15) (-5,19)
0,412*** 0,699*** 0,293***STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
DUMMY (4,69) (18,06) (3,91)
-0,505* 0,341* -0,216CONSTANT (-1,90) (1,78) (-0,99)
R2 0,3339 0,9352 0,2940
N 564 564 564
Breusch-Pagan 1038,95*** 1107,19*** 1013,45***
Wald-Wooldridge 0,51 2,59*** 0,72
Chi2  Wald 181,94*** 65156,08*** 142,32***
NOTE  PCSE (RE): Panel Corrected Standard Errors (random effects); PCSE (FE): Panel Corrected Standard Errors (fixed effects) 
All regression results are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   Does not exist multicollinearity (VIF <10).
*,**,***Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 3: Impact of family ownership on degree and type of diversification: existence of a non-linear relationship
TOTAL 
DIVERSIFICATION
RELATED 
DIVERSIFICATION
UNRELATED 
DIVERSIFICATION
PCSE (RE) PCSE (FE) PCSE (RE)
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3)
-0,620** -0,121 -0,503**%5 MAIN SHAREHOLDERS * 
FAMILY (-2,29) (-0,60) (-2,25)
0,690** 0,087 0,495*(% 5 MAIN SHAREHOLDERS * 
FAMILY)2 (2,20) (0,56) (1,92)
0,107*** -0,009 0,070***LN SIZE (5,40) (-0,69) (4,34)
0,005 -0,062*** 0,009LN AGE (0,21) (-3,22) (0,34)
-0,108 -0,030 -0,035DEBT (-1,23) (-1,08) (-0,49)
-0,269** -0,056 -0,176INTANGIBLE (-1,97) (-1,38) (-1,48)
-0,887*** -0,083** -0,709***ECONOMIC RETURN-
ECONOMIC RETURN YEAR (-5,41) (-2,23) (-4,93)
-0,047*** 0,000 -0,047***CAPITAL INTENSITY (-4,36) (0,11) (-5,11)
0,399*** 1,039*** 0,285***STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
DUMMY (4,45) (17,58) (3,74)
-0,497* 0,363* -0,232CONSTANT (-1,90) (1,88) (-1,07)
R2 0,3326 0,9355 0,2927
N 564 564 564
Breusch-Pagan 1025,40*** 1084,28*** 1012,58***
Wald-Wooldridge 0,38 1,65* 0,39
Chi2  Wald 168,18*** 64587,82 135,61***
NOTE. PCSE (RE): Panel Corrected Standard Errors (random effects); PCSE (FE): Panel Corrected Standard Errors (fixed effects) 
All regression results are corrected for heteroskedasticity.   Does not exist multicollinearity (VIF <10).
*,**,***Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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